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considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate
misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers.
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triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future
research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential
links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the ‘Aha!’ moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes
involved in insight solution.
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Abstract 350 words 27 
A new protocol for eliciting insight (’Aha!’/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of 28 
British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and 29 
the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different 30 
types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, 31 
anagrams, rebus and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as ‘classic’ thematic or spatial 32 
challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the ‘Aha!’ 33 
moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the 34 
positive emotional ‘payback’ has an energizing effect on a participant’s motivation to continue 35 
solving. 36 
 37 
Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits ‘Aha!’ moments, cryptics 38 
should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword 39 
paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution 40 
rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a 41 
In r vi
Aha moment Insight and Crosswords 
2 
limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight 42 
problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same 43 
medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing 44 
us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue 45 
more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. 46 
 47 
Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an ‘insight problem’ per se: typically, problems 48 
can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for 49 
cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the 50 
difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is 51 
outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an 52 
exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the ‘Aha!’ 53 
moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution. 54 
 55 
Introduction: insight and ‘insight problems’ 56 
The feeling of insight - a sudden, euphoric ‘cognitive snap’ (Weisberg, 2015) signaling a 57 
breakthrough in the solution of a problem - is well-known to most of us. In terms of its 58 
phenomenological experience, four key elements of the insight, or ‘Aha!’ moment have been 59 
identified: first, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the resolution, which arrives unheralded by 60 
conscious awareness of the solution path or ‘feelings of warmth’ at the approaching dénouement; 61 
secondly that - however difficult it had proved before (perhaps involving a state of impasse) - the 62 
problem can be rapidly processed once the solution has been identified; thirdly that there is a 63 
strong, typically positive, emotional response at the point of resolution; and finally that the solver is 64 
fully convinced that the correct solution has been identified  (Topolinski & Reber, 2010a; see also 65 
Metcalfe, 1986; Davidson, 1995; Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Danek, Fraps, Von Müller, Grothe, & 66 
Öllinger, 2014b, 2014a; Kounios & Beeman, 2014; Shen, Yuan, Liu, & Luo, 2015; on negative insight 67 
('Uh-oh') see also Hill & Kemp, 2016). The phenomenological experience of the Aha! moment is thus 68 
complex, with at least four contributory components: suddenness, surprise, happiness and certainty 69 
(Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Danek, et al., 2014a; Danek, Wiley, & Öllinger, 2016). 70 
 71 
One of the key problems in studying insight is the unpredictability of this moment in everyday life. 72 
Although ‘everyday insight moments’ can be experienced (such as the sudden realization of where a 73 
bunch of keys has been left), the sudden and fleeting nature of this moment has led most studies to 74 
attempt to elicit responses artificially under laboratory conditions, using a bank of so-called ‘insight 75 
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problems’ intended to trigger the identical phenomenological response (Hill & Kemp, 2016). 76 
Nonetheless, even this approach is not without issues, primarily centered upon the difficulty of 77 
finding an effective, convenient and reliable insight-triggering task for the participant to solve. 78 
 79 
Current obstacles in exploring insight in the laboratory 80 
Lab studies of insight in problem solving have met with a number of obstacles, which have been well 81 
rehearsed in the literature. These include the historic paucity of standardized problem material 82 
(MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008; Batchelder & Alexander, 2012; Danek, et al., 2014b); the difficulty 83 
and complexity of the tasks, leading to low solution rates and low numbers of problem trials within 84 
the practical limitations of investigative time-frames (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b; MacGregor & 85 
Cunningham, 2008; Batchelder & Alexander, 2012; Danek, et al., 2016); and the memory advantage 86 
obtained for solutions arrived at by insight  (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000; Danek, Fraps, von Müller, 87 
Grothe, & Öllinger, 2013) which rules out test-retest options (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008). 88 
 89 
This last issue poses a particular problem for controlled, lab-based research, given that the solutions 90 
to so many of the classic riddle-style ‘insight problems’ (e.g. the 9-dot problem, the reversed triangle 91 
of coins, the broken necklace challenge - Cunningham, MacGregor, Gibb, & Haar, 2009 - see figure 1) 92 
are now freely available on-line and in puzzle collections; this commonly leads to the need to discard 93 
trials due to familiarity with the puzzles (Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2014; see also Danek, et al., 94 
2016).  95 
 96 
<Insert figure 1 somewhere here> 97 
 98 
Following attempts to increase the pool of test material in recent years, larger collections of 99 
calibrated problems do now exist (Chu & MacGregor, 2011): these have moved away from the 100 
classic ‘riddle-style’ puzzles (Webb, Little, & Cropper, 2016) and might include matchstick arithmetic 101 
problems (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999), compound remote association problems 102 
(’CRA’ - a variation of ‘Remote Association Test’ (RAT) problems - Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b), 103 
the ‘Car Park Game’ (Jones, 2003), rebus puzzles (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008), Bongard 104 
problems and ‘tricky series completion’ problems (Batchelder & Alexander, 2012). Recently, magic 105 
tricks have been added to the list of available paradigms (Danek, et al., 2014b). 106 
 107 
When is insight ‘insight’? 108 
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The use of a canonical set of ‘insight problems’ to explore Aha! moments in the laboratory has led to 109 
a long-standing debate concerning the underlying cognitive mechanisms involved in their solution: 110 
specifically, whether an Aha! feeling is the result of ‘special’ thought processes, or is merely an 111 
epiphenomenon arising from cognitive processes which are ‘business as usual’ (for a review of this 112 
debate see Davidson, 1995; Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Ohlsson, 2011; Gilhooly, 113 
Ball, & Macchi, 2015; Weisberg, 2015). One confounding issue which has hampered investigation of 114 
this question is the common assumption in many historical studies that ‘insight problems’ are, per 115 
se, always solved with insight by every successful solver; in other words, that ‘triggering insight’ is an 116 
inherent and objective property of the ‘insight problem’ which unfailingly comes into play (Bowden 117 
& Jung-Beeman, 2007; Ohlsson, 2011; Öllinger, et al., 2014). Crucially, as a result of this a priori 118 
assumption, no check was typically made as to whether the ‘Aha!’ moment had actually been 119 
experienced in these trials, leading to a highly problematic circularity: “Insight problems are 120 
problems that require insight, and insight occurs when insight problems are solved” (Öllinger & 121 
Knoblich, 2009, p.277; see also Danek, et al., 2016; Webb, et al., 2016). An early attempt (Weisberg, 122 
2015; see Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009) to circumvent this problem by categorizing ‘insight problems’ 123 
into ‘pure’ problems (those that could only be solved with insight), ‘hybrid’ problems (those that 124 
could be solved through insight and other methods) and ‘non-insight’ problems (those which are 125 
always resolved through an analytical approach) nonetheless still requires that a subset of problems 126 
exists which infallibly trigger insight. 127 
 128 
A critical flaw in this approach is that it overlooks the interactive nature of problem solving: 129 
successful solving arises from the interplay of problem and person, with each individual bringing an 130 
unique blend of knowledge, experience and cognitive approaches to bear upon it (Ash, et al., 2009; 131 
Ohlsson, 2011). It is therefore entirely possible for a so-called ‘insight puzzle’ to be solved through 132 
controlled, deliberate, systematic and evaluative means by some solvers - analytic ‘Type 2’ thinking 133 
according to dual process theory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 2015; 134 
Weisberg, 2015) - which is not thought to give rise to a characteristically strong emotional response, 135 
other than satisfaction at the job completed (Kounios & Beeman, 2014). 136 
 137 
Others, however, may solve the same puzzle with a flash of inspiration that they could not predict, 138 
through processes operating below the threshold of their awareness, and will experience the impact 139 
of the Aha! moment. Much will depend on what each solver brings to the solving process: “each 140 
problem can be solved without insight if the initial problem representation is adequate and the 141 
appropriate heuristics are available” (Öllinger, et al., 2014 p.267), and this will vary from solver to 142 
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solver according to their skill-set and experience. The presence or absence of insight thus resides in 143 
the solver’s approach to solving the puzzle, not simply in the problem itself (Bowden & Jung-144 
Beeman, 2007; Cunningham, et al., 2009; Webb, et al., 2016), and the categorization of ‘insight 145 
problem’ stimuli as ‘pure’ or ‘hybrid’, or ‘insight/non-insight’ on the grounds of a hypothetical 146 
cognitive task analysis appears to be fundamentally flawed (Ash, et al., 2009; Webb, et al., 2016). 147 
 148 
The purpose of insight research should not therefore be to develop a single theory which accounts 149 
for all solutions to ‘insight problems’ arrived at by any manner under experimental conditions 150 
(Ohlsson, 2011), but to isolate those solutions which have evoked the  phenomenological events 151 
specifically characteristic of an Aha! event, and to use these to explore the cognitive mechanisms 152 
underlying this experience (Webb, et al., 2016). More contemporary studies have typically achieved 153 
this by collecting subjective feedback from trial participants as to whether they have actually 154 
experienced an ‘Aha!’ moment at the point of solution (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007; Kounios, et 155 
al., 2008; Cranford & Moss, 2011; Jarosz, Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012; Danek, et al., 2014b; Salvi, 156 
Costantini, Bricolo, Perugini, & Beeman, 2016; Webb, et al., 2016). This technique has been validated 157 
by a number of neuroimaging studies, which have empirically demonstrated meaningful differences 158 
between problems identified by participants as being solved with insight, or in a step-wise fashion 159 
(Zhao, et al., 2013; Kounios & Beeman, 2014). 160 
 161 
Representational Change Theory 162 
Notwithstanding this, it would be unhelpful to reject the term ‘insight problem’ altogether, given 163 
that it is clear that some cognitive puzzles are more likely to trigger insight moments than others 164 
(Danek, et al., 2014a), and indeed ‘insight problems’ may operate along a continuum of efficacy 165 
(Webb, et al., 2016). In particular, Representational Change Theory (’RCT’ - Ohlsson, Ernst, & Rees, 166 
1992; Knoblich, et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 2011; Öllinger, et al., 2014) suggests that especially effective 167 
insight-triggering puzzles use the solver’s prior knowledge and expectations to deliberately induce a 168 
false conceptualization of the problem (Ovington, Saliba, & Goldring, 2016), leading to self-imposed 169 
constraints which impede a solution. This can result in a feeling of ‘impasse’: the situation where the 170 
solver feels that they have explored all possible approaches to resolving the problem, and is now at a 171 
loss as to what to try next (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). 172 
 173 
The moment of insight is argued to be the point at which the hindering constraint is suddenly 174 
removed, leading to a relaxation of the impasse and the rapid redefining of the problem space, 175 
followed by a swift solution. The initially incorrect reading of the problem - termed ’mental set’ by  176 
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the Gestalt school (Wiley, 1998; Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2008) - is argued to arise unavoidably 177 
and unconsciously from implicit assumptions or well-practiced  procedures which are activated 178 
highly automatically (Ohlsson, et al., 1992; Knoblich, et al., 1999; DeYoung, Flanders, & Peterson, 179 
2008; Öllinger, et al., 2008; Danek, et al., 2014b; Patrick, Ahmed, Smy, Seeby, & Sambrooks, 2015), 180 
making the less obvious, but correct, interpretation of the problem very unlikely to come to mind. It 181 
is the dropping of the incorrect assumptions, and disengagement from the outdated hypothesis, 182 
which is argued to allow progress to be made. 183 
 184 
Heterogeneous Nature of Insight Puzzles and their Mechanisms 185 
It is thus widely acknowledged that ‘insight problem’ solving involves some form of reconstructive 186 
change of the initial representation of the problem (Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004; 187 
Cunningham, et al., 2009; Danek, et al., 2014a); however, the precise mechanisms to achieve this 188 
reconstruction - and whether they are in any way ‘special’ - remain unclear. 189 
 190 
A number of theoretical models to explain this restructuring in classic insight puzzles, such as the 9-191 
dot or the 8-coin puzzles, have been put forward: for example ‘elaboration, re-encoding or 192 
constraint relaxation’ (Ohlsson, et al., 1992); ‘opportunistic assimilation’ (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, 193 
Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995); ‘constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition’ (Knoblich, et al., 1999); 194 
‘solution-recoding’ (Chronicle, et al., 2004); see further the reviews by Ash, Cushen, & Wiley (2009) 195 
and Batchelder & Alexander (2012). Nonetheless, since the formulation of these theories, a wider 196 
range of insight-triggering paradigms has been developed which on at least superficial grounds differ 197 
greatly in their appearance and the demands they make upon the solver (Bowden, et al., 2005). It is 198 
therefore at least possible that the cognitive processes leading up to the moment of restructuring 199 
differ according to the specific puzzle parameters at play (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007), making a 200 
single-process theory of restructuring difficult (Cunningham, et al., 2009). 201 
 202 
In a study comparing the relationships among a small range of diverse insight puzzles (classic ‘spatial’ 203 
puzzles, RAT puzzles and rebus problems), Cunningham and colleagues identified the following 204 
characteristics of restructuring which they believed were displayed, to a greater or lesser extent, by 205 
each of their puzzle formats of interest (Cunningham, et al., 2009). As predicted by RCT, some 206 
puzzles involved the need to overcome misdirection or the relaxation of automatically elicited 207 
constraints concerning the existing components of the puzzle or its spatial layout  (Cunningham, et 208 
al., 2009). However, in others, the primary difficulty appeared to lie in identifying what the eventual 209 
solution would look like, perhaps requiring the assimilation of extra incidental information, a sudden 210 
I  v
w
Aha moment Insight and Crosswords 
7 
‘figure-ground’ reversal of perspective, or additional steps in order to hit upon the solution 211 
(Cunningham, et al., 2009). 212 
 213 
One methodological issue thus lies in how ‘well-defined’ a problem type is (DeYoung, et al., 2008; 214 
see also Simon, 1973; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003; Davidson, 2003; Hélie & Sun, 2010; Danek, 215 
et al., 2016; Ovington, et al., 2016; Webb, et al., 2016). An ill-defined problem has no clear 216 
representation of the problem space in terms of key features such as the initial conceptualization of 217 
the challenge, the final goal state, and the mechanizable steps which need to be taken to achieve 218 
this goal. By contrast, ‘well-defined’ problems may be tackled by controlled and systematic 219 
paradigmatic processes leading to steady progress towards a known target state (Smith, 2003; 220 
DeYoung, et al., 2008), and better defined problems of this kind therefore lead less often to solution 221 
through insight (Webb, et al., 2016). 222 
 223 
Despite early attempts to categorize insight puzzles (e.g. as pure/hybrid) according to solving 224 
process (Ohlsson, et al., 1992; Weisberg, 1995; Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000), the heterogeneous 225 
nature of the various problem collections therefore makes equivalence studies difficult (Weisberg, 226 
1995; Cunningham, et al., 2009), and this limits our understanding of the core components of 227 
problem solving with insight  (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b; MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008). 228 
Attempts to find one single explanation of the cognitive processes leading to insight solution by 229 
pitting alternative theories against each other on a single puzzle type (e.g. Jones, 2003)  may on this 230 
account be doomed: it is entirely possible that insight could arise from different interacting sets of 231 
preceding processes depending upon the context and the challenge inherent in the problem and 232 
that these processes may only imperfectly map onto these traditional problem type categories 233 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007; Shen, et al., 2016). A theoretical or computational model of ‘insight 234 
problem’ solving which satisfactorily explains all facets and styles of insight challenge is therefore 235 
proving elusive (Ash, et al., 2009; Batchelder & Alexander, 2012). 236 
 237 
Rapid Solving and Incubated Problems 238 
Equally vexed is the question of whether a period of impasse is always involved in ‘insight problem’-239 
solving (as argued e.g. by Ohlsson, et al., 1992), with some studies reporting that - even within 240 
puzzle type - solvers did not uniformly experience a period of impasse (Cranford & Moss, 2012; Ash, 241 
Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Danek, et al., 2014a). 242 
 243 
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Indeed, studies have suggested that solvers can experience an instantaneous ‘Aha!’ moment within 244 
seconds of the presentation of the puzzle. In a study of anagram solving, Novick and Sherman noted 245 
that ‘pop-out’ solutions tended to be the first solution offered and to occur within 2 seconds of the 246 
presentation of the letters (Novick & Sherman, 2003). In trials of highly skilled anagram solvers, 47% 247 
of the solutions were reported to be immediate ‘pop-out’ solutions, where the solver agreed that, 248 
“The solution came to mind suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere. I have no awareness of having 249 
done anything to try to get the answer.” By contrast 27% of solutions occurred with insight after a 250 
period of trying fruitless combinations; and 26% were generated incrementally by the recursive 251 
testing of morphemically probable combinations (non-insight search solutions). 252 
 253 
Similarly, a study of RAT problems (Cranford & Moss, 2012), found that 171 out of 218 solutions 254 
arrived at with self-reported insight, under think-aloud conditions, were solved almost immediately, 255 
in a mean time of 7.1 seconds. These were categorized as ‘Immediate Insight’ (II) moments; 256 
however, the authors also raised the possibility that the solution might simply have occurred so fast 257 
that it appeared sudden and surprising, without evoking the full phenomenological experience 258 
(Cranford & Moss, 2012; see also Topolinski & Reber, 2010b). Indeed, an fMRI study comparing II 259 
with Delayed Insight (DI) RAT solutions showed large differences in activation patterns for the two 260 
types of insight, suggesting that they may represent distinct solution processes (Cranford & Moss, 261 
2011). For this reason, some later studies have excluded II solutions from their discussion, on the 262 
grounds that they may not reflect the full “Aha!” experience (e.g. Salvi, Bricolo, Kounios, Bowden, & 263 
Beeman, 2016). 264 
 265 
Conversely, the benefits of a period of incubation (non-conscious solving activity, or a period of 266 
respite away from the problem) in resolving problems which have reached impasse have been well-267 
documented (see the meta-analytic review by Sio & Ormerod, 2009; also Ohlsson, 2011; Baird, et al., 268 
2012; Sio & Ormerod, 2015; Gilhooly, 2016), although the mechanisms which account for the 269 
facilitation of the solution (e.g. ‘unconscious work’, ‘intermittent work’, ‘beneficial forgetting’ - 270 
Gilhooly, 2016) are as yet unclear. Incubation is clearly not always involved in insight problem 271 
resolution - though it was present as the second of Wallas’ (1926) four stages of insight problem-272 
solving (Sio & Ormerod, 2009) - and is rather seen as an ancillary feature, to be utilized where 273 
necessary (Gilhooly, 2016). Engaging in a diversionary activity with a low cognitive load appears to 274 
be most helpful (Sio & Ormerod, 2009), and many people report that the problem solution occurs to 275 
them when engaged in everyday activities such as walking, driving or showering (Ovington, Saliba, 276 
I  revi
w
Aha moment Insight and Crosswords 
9 
Moran, Goldring, & MacDonald, 2015; Hill & Kemp, 2016); a substantial number also report 277 
facilitation overnight, during their dreams or immediately upon waking (Ovington, et al., 2015). 278 
 279 
Cryptic Crosswords as potential triggers of Insight 280 
Cryptic (British-style) crosswords afford a unique opportunity to explore the mechanisms of insight 281 
and the issues highlighted above within an existing, readily available puzzle format. Devised in the 282 
mid 1920’s (Connor, 2014), cryptic crosswords employ an extensive variety of highly ingenious 283 
puzzle mechanisms, many of which also draw on shared characteristics with a range of other types 284 
of ‘insight problem’ (see review below). One puzzle may thus encapsulate a wide range of these 285 
mechanisms, presenting a compendium of heterogeneous insight challenges unrivalled by any other 286 
insight puzzle format. Studying cryptic crosswords may therefore enable us to understand better the 287 
antecedents, solving processes and key triggers of the insight moment. 288 
 289 
What are ‘cryptic crosswords’? 290 
The nature of the cryptic crossword has been described in some detail in an earlier paper 291 
(Friedlander & Fine, 2016), but key aspects are highlighted again below. Example cryptic crossword 292 
clues, together with an explanation of the cryptic instructions for achieving the required solution, 293 
are set out in Boxes 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. <insert box 1 somewhere around here>. 294 
Unlike their ‘straight definition’ American cousins, the challenge of the British-style cryptic 295 
crossword lies not in the obscurity of the vocabulary to be retrieved, but in the quasi-algebraic 296 
coded instructions which must be executed precisely in order to achieve the correct answer to the 297 
clue (Friedlander & Fine, 2016): see Box 1. Cryptic crossword clues usually comprise two elements: a 298 
straight definition, plus the cryptic instructions for assembling the required solution—the 299 
“wordplay” (Friedlander & Fine, 2016; Pham, 2016). It is not always obvious which part of the clue is 300 
fulfilling what role, and there is often no clear division between the two parts (Friedlander & Fine, 301 
2016). Even the ‘definitional’ element of the clue might be obliquely or whimsically referenced, 302 
consciously exploiting ambiguities such as grammatical form, phrasal semantics, homophones, 303 
synonyms and roundabout expressions (Cleary, 1996; Aarons, 2015; Friedlander & Fine, 2016). The 304 
clue type also has to be identified and interpreted. All these factors mean that that cryptic 305 
crosswords are typically ill-defined in both problem conceptualization and solution methodology 306 
(Johnstone, 2001). 307 
 308 
Each cryptic crossword clue is thus a tricky linguistic puzzle using non-literal interpretations of 309 
deconstructed clue components in a ‘truly slippery and fundamentally ambiguous’ fashion (Aarons, 310 
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2012, p.224), stretching the conventions of everyday speech at all levels of structure and context 311 
(Aarons, 2015). The misdirection is deliberate: the surface reading of the clue evokes our tacit 312 
knowledge of language to suggest a plausible, yet unhelpful, interpretation of the clue (the ‘red 313 
herring’), setting up a constraint which must be resolved for progress to be made (Aarons, 2015; 314 
Friedlander & Fine, 2016). Once accomplished, the ‘Aha!’ experience is triggered:  this is termed the 315 
‘Penny Dropping Moment’ or ‘PDM’ by crossword solvers (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). 316 
 317 
In this use of misdirection, cryptic crosswords are similar to magic tricks: in both areas, the 318 
practitioner exploits implicit assumptions of the audience which are activated highly automatically, 319 
either (in magic) because of long-term exposure to the natural laws governing everyday life, such as 320 
gravity  (Danek, et al., 2014b) or (in crosswords) because of a lifetime’s parsing habits as a reader 321 
and interpreter of standard text (Schulman, 1996). The task of the setter, as for the magician, is to 322 
conceal the clue mechanism so subtly that the pathway is not readily detectable (Friedlander & Fine, 323 
2016). 324 
 325 
Once deconstructed in this manner, there is no requirement for the cryptic components to make 326 
further sense as a coherent whole: the beguilingly smooth surface reading of the clue is typically 327 
abandoned in favor of a potpourri of dissociated cryptic fragments, each serving a quite different 328 
purpose entirely ungoverned by word-order, grammatical or orthographic considerations (Pham, 329 
2016). In this way cryptic crosswords can be seen as a type of ‘non-bona fide communication’ 330 
(Aarons, 2015, p.357): the solver understands that the normal rules of communication must be 331 
temporarily suspended (just as they are required to suspend disbelief at a magic show), and that the 332 
clue itself is simply a vehicle for the intellectual challenge of solving the clue. 333 
 334 
Range of cryptic clue challenges and parallels with other insight problems 335 
Although there is general agreement that the clues have to be fairly constructed (i.e., 336 
unambiguously solvable), there are no hard-and-fast guidelines as to what the rules of engagement 337 
are (Aarons, 2015; Friedlander & Fine, 2016), leading to an almost infinite number of innovative 338 
ways to exploit the “versatile and quirky English language” (Connor, 2013). Nevertheless, there is 339 
some consensus over a number of basic mechanism types, and a range of “Teach-Yourself” primers 340 
exist (Friedlander & Fine, 2016; see also now the on-line solving channel - Anthony & Goodliffe, 341 
vlog).  A brief review of the most striking parallels between a variety of insight puzzles and the 342 
mechanics of solving cryptic crosswords follows.  343 
 344 
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Jokes and cryptic crosswords: deliberate misdirection 345 
Individual differences in the ability to appreciate humor have been previously identified 346 
(Cunningham & Derks, 2005; Kozbelt & Nishioka, 2010; Dunbar, Launay, & Curry, 2016)  and cryptic 347 
crossword solvers appear to be particularly attuned to and to enjoy verbal ambiguity and wordplay. 348 
In a study involving solvers and non-solvers (Underwood, MacKeith, & Everatt, 1988) the strongest 349 
correlation associated with cryptic puzzle-solving was the frequency of incidentally elicited laughter 350 
during an experiment involving associative priming (e.g. ‘strawberry’ priming ‘traffic’ through the 351 
unpresented word ‘jam’). 352 
 353 
Linguistic jokes share many characteristics with cryptic crosswords, including deliberate misdirection 354 
(Aarons, 2015), and - although only rarely used as such in the lab - jokes have been identified as a 355 
type of insight puzzle (Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Ramachandran, 1998; Robertson, 2001; Kounios & 356 
Jung-Beeman, 2009; Kozbelt & Nishioka, 2010; Amir, Biederman, Wang, & Xu, 2015) on the basis of 357 
the suddenness and rapidity of the solution, the lack of ‘feeling-of-warmth’, the pleasant feelings 358 
evoked at the moment of understanding, and the feeling of certainty in the correctness of the 359 
solution. A punning joke is typically based on two alternative interpretations of a scripted feed-line, 360 
which are both plausible in some sense, however absurd,  ‘until the punchline, which highlights the 361 
initially less obvious one, and reveals the other to be a dummy, designed intentionally to mislead the 362 
listener’ (Aarons, 2015, p.352). 363 
 364 
Working in a parallel tradition to that of psychological insight studies, linguistic humor studies have 365 
long explored the operation of jokes in the context of a two-stage process of ‘Incongruity-366 
Resolution’ (for a review see Forabosco, 2008), which shares many points of similarity with RCT. 367 
‘Incongruity-Resolution’ proposes that the expectations of the joke’s audience are deliberately 368 
manipulated to predict a sensible, but incorrect outcome, making the actual punchline initially 369 
unexpected or incongruous (the ’surprise’ phase). In the second phase (termed ‘coherence’), the 370 
listener then engages in a rapid form of problem-solving in order to revisit and resolve the 371 
incongruity, enabling the punchline to make plausible sense once it has been reconciled with an 372 
amusing and perhaps off-beat alternative interpretation of the original joke setting (Suls, 1972; 373 
Bartolo, Benuzzi, Nocetti, Baraldi, & Nichelli, 2006; Forabosco, 2008; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams, 374 
2011; Canestrari & Bianchi, 2012). In other words, they must backtrack to search for an implicit 375 
constraint in their interpretation of the joke wording, which can be relaxed sufficiently to 376 
accommodate both the joke setting and its punchline within a revised interpretative structure (Suls, 377 
1972; Navon, 1988). This process takes only a short time: there is an inverted relationship between 378 
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speed of appreciation and funniness ratings (Cunningham & Derks, 2005; Kozbelt & Nishioka, 2010), 379 
and a joke falls flat if the explanation is too labored (Kozbelt & Nishioka, 2010). 380 
 381 
If interpreted literally, the initially less dominant meaning  (‘latent content’ - Kozbelt & Nishioka, 382 
2010; Erdelyi, 2014) underpinning the correct interpretation of the punchline is often inappropriate, 383 
impossible or surreal: an ‘as if’ resolution (Navon, 1988; Amir, et al., 2015) which is “seemingly 384 
appropriate but virtually inappropriate” (Navon, 1988, p.210) and - as for cryptic crosswords and 385 
magic tricks - functions “only on account of a willing suspension of disbelief” (Attardo, Hempelmann, 386 
& Di Maio, 2002, p.5). It is at this point that we experience the emotional payback, as we ’get’ the 387 
joke, with the sudden, absurd resolution eliciting laughter; recent studies have begun to explore the 388 
neural correlates of these humorous insight moments (Amir, et al., 2015; Chan, 2016).  389 
 390 
The workings of this mechanism are exemplified in the following joke: 391 
 ‘So, I bought some animal crackers, and the box said:  392 
 “Do not consume if the seal is broken”…’ (attrib. Brian Kiley) 393 
Here, the listener is primed to interpret the term ‘seal’ in terms of the intact packaging containing 394 
the foodstuff. The punchline seems incongruously out of place given that a joke is ostensibly being 395 
recounted: it appears to be a banal repetition of standard wording commonly found on packaged 396 
goods, and is not inherently amusing. The feeling of ‘missing something’ - that “nagging sort of 397 
anxiety when you sense that something is funny-huh” (Hurley, et al., 2011, p.79) evokes an 398 
uncomfortable state of incongruity akin to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Forabosco, 2008; 399 
Yim, 2016), and this discomfort will provide the motivational drive to reconcile or reduce the 400 
perceived inconsistency by reassessing the initial interpretation of the joke setting.  It is only upon 401 
reinterpreting the word ‘seal’ (in the context of ‘animal crackers’) that the alternative and 402 
nonsensical latent content of the joke emerges: that the crackers should not be eaten if the seal 403 
biscuit is broken.  404 
 405 
Similarly, the cryptic crossword clue at Box 2(a) leads initially to a deceptively straightforward 406 
solution (’Scared stiff’), which perhaps only subsequently reveals the underlying pun ‘Stiff -> Corpse -407 
> Frightened to death’, confirming the accuracy of the solution. 408 
 409 
<INSERT BOX 2 SOMEWHERE HERE> 410 
 411 
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Fundamental to punning humor of this nature is the concept of ‘bisociation’ – the perceiving of a 412 
situation in two incompatible frames of reference (Koestler, 1964; Dienhart, 1999; Canestrari & 413 
Bianchi, 2012). Following this account, ambiguous phonetic forms such as homophones, homonyms 414 
and polysemes can act as triggers which abruptly switch the listener from one semantic script (e.g. 415 
‘seal = box packaging’) to another (e.g. ‘seal = biscuit shape’). Koestler sees this as a sudden ‘Gestalt’ 416 
reversal (Koestler, 1964).   417 
 418 
Key to the workings of the joke or crossword clue is the initial concealment of the alternative 419 
meaning; and indeed it is a general feature of insight puzzles that the solution typically involves a 420 
statistically infrequent response, such as an unusual use for an object, or a less familiar, less 421 
dominant meaning for a word or phrase (Dominowski, 1995). So, for example, the cryptic crossword 422 
clue at Box 2(b) requires the solver to recognize that a potential solution word (’unearthed’), in its 423 
prototypical sense of ‘discovered’, has a second, non-intuitive but highly appropriate role to play in 424 
the clue (’without an earth wire’). 425 
 426 
The cryptic crossword solver is thus often gulled into a readily available, but false interpretation of 427 
the clue setting (the ‘surface reading’) based on a prima facie interpretation of everyday linguistic 428 
rules, ambiguous phonetic forms, learned phraseological conventions, and context. This approach 429 
leads initially to nagging puzzlement, impasse and cognitive dissonance, since the original 430 
interpretation cannot be made to yield the desired answer (the solver is ‘missing something’). This 431 
provides the motivation to detect and explore alternative interpretations (some perhaps fruitlessly) 432 
in order to arrive at the moment of insight. As with jokes, the cryptic crossword’s ‘pay-off’ (the final 433 
understanding of the clue) arrives when the original constraints are abruptly overturned in favor of a 434 
switch to an alternative, non-intuitive reading of the cryptic elements - often leading to surprise, 435 
laughter and the delight of the PDM (Aarons, 2015). No matter how lengthy and difficult this 436 
problem-solving phase has been, the clue is typically processed rapidly once the constraint is cracked 437 
(Topolinski & Reber, 2010a). 438 
 439 
Rebus puzzles and cryptic crosswords: reinterpretation of visual/spatial elements 440 
Although many cryptic crossword clues rely heavily on punning misdirection, many also employ clue 441 
mechanisms which indicate that letters or letter blocks must be transposed, reversed, removed, 442 
substituted, extracted from a sequence or read as an acrostic (Aarons, 2015). In these clues, the 443 
elements providing the wordplay fodder must be decontextualized from the natural surface reading, 444 
either abandoning meaning altogether, or taking on new meaning of their own. Once these problem-445 
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irrelevant ‘chunks’ have been decomposed (Knoblich, et al., 1999) the components are redeployed 446 
in quasi-algebraic fashion to form new units answering to the clue definition (Friedlander & Fine, 447 
2016): see further Box 1. 448 
 449 
One clue type of this nature is the ‘charade’: a type of riddle in which the whole word is hinted at 450 
enigmatically by reference to its component syllables (Chambers, 2014). In this process, cryptic 451 
crosswords may not observe morphological rules: for example, the word ‘discourage’  would be 452 
segmented linguistically as ‘dis-courage’, but in a cryptic crossword might be clued, as ‘Di (girl’s 453 
name) + scour + age’ (Aarons, 2015). See further clues 1(a) and 4(f) in Boxes 1 and 4.   454 
 455 
<INSERT BOX 3 SOMEWHERE HERE> 456 
 457 
Similarly, rebus puzzles rely on the manipulation of words and word fragments to suggest common 458 
phrases which fit the clues displayed in a ‘word-picture’.  Common rebus types involve charades, the 459 
interpretation of the spatial locations of words in relation to each other, typographical trends (letter 460 
size growing, decreasing), font size or color (capitalization etc.), numbers, and letters as words 461 
(MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008; Salvi, Costantini, et al., 2016): see examples in Box 3. Rebus 462 
puzzles are also examples of ill-defined problems (Salvi, Costantini, et al., 2016): the mechanisms for 463 
achieving the problem solution are unclear to the solver, who may have to try multiple strategies 464 
before hitting upon a productive approach. As with cryptic crosswords, the solver has to relax the 465 
ingrained rules of reading in order to overcome their tacit understanding of word-form and 466 
contextual interpretation and to achieve a restructuring of the problem space (Salvi, Costantini, et 467 
al., 2016). For this reason, they are likely to trigger the insight experience (MacGregor & 468 
Cunningham, 2008; Salvi, Costantini, et al., 2016).  469 
 470 
Rebus puzzles typically rely on the literal and quirky interpretation of encrypted elements and their 471 
spatial arrangement, which are interpreted as part of the solution (MacGregor & Cunningham, 472 
2008). In the British TV programme ‘Catchphrase’, which was based upon the solving of pictorially 473 
displayed rebus-type puzzles, the host, Roy Walker, used the tag line “Say what you see” in order to 474 
prompt contestants to find the solution (Wikipedia, 2017b). This is precisely the approach needed by 475 
a number of the rebus-style cryptic crossword clues in Box 4 which use highly inventive gimmicks to 476 
cryptically represent the solution word (clues 4 b-e). 477 
 478 
<INSERT BOX 4 SOMEWHERE HERE> 479 
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 480 
Anagrams and cryptic crosswords: dechunking, pattern detection and misdirection 481 
Anagrams have been routinely used in investigations of insight (for a review, see Ellis, Glaholt, & 482 
Reingold, 2011) - both for anagram solving (e.g. Novick & Sherman, 2003; Kounios, et al., 2008; Salvi, 483 
Bricolo, et al., 2016) and through the use of a paradigm requiring a simple judgment as to whether 484 
the anagram was solvable or not, in order to explore ‘feelings of warmth’ and solution speed (e.g. 485 
Novick & Sherman, 2003; Topolinski & Reber, 2010b). 486 
 487 
Studies of anagram solution have consistently reported that solvers approach anagram problems 488 
using two different strategies (e.g. Novick & Sherman, 2003; Kounios, et al., 2008; Ellis, et al., 2011; 489 
Salvi, Bricolo, et al., 2016): a search methodology, using a process of serially testing out and rejecting 490 
solutions based on morphemically probable letter combinations; and ‘pop-out’ solutions (Novick & 491 
Sherman, 2003) whereby the solution bursts suddenly into consciousness without apparent work, 492 
often almost instantaneously.  EEG research has demonstrated that self-reports distinguishing 493 
between ‘pop-out’ and search anagram solving are reliably accurate (Kounios, et al., 2008); this 494 
study also provides evidence that  individual differences determine the solver’s preferred strategy, 495 
and that different patterns of brain activity are associated with the two approaches. 496 
 497 
It is well-established that structural features of the letter stimuli which are to be anagrammed (such 498 
as whether they are pronounceable, or form a real word in their own right) affect the difficulty and 499 
solution times of the puzzle. Thus, ZELBA or OARLY should be more difficult to resolve than HNWEI 500 
or AOSLR; and HEART should be more difficult to unscramble than THREA  (Dominowski, 1969; 501 
Novick & Sherman, 2008; Ellis & Reingold, 2014; for a review see Topolinski, Bakhtiari, & Erle, 2016). 502 
Dominowski suggests that the pronounceability of the letters leads solvers to deal with them as a 503 
unit rather than as a letter-sequence (Dominowski, 1969): in other words, that familiarity with the 504 
letter patterns sets up an obstacle to solution by accessing automatically stored ‘chunks’ of data 505 
which will be inappropriate to the solution (cf. Knoblich, et al., 1999). It is the decomposing of these 506 
chunks into component letters which paves the way to the solution. 507 
 508 
Anagram clues are a staple of cryptic crosswords (Upadhyay, 2008b; Aarons, 2015 p.371), being 509 
formed of the letters to be anagrammed (the ‘fodder’), an anagram indicator and the definition of 510 
the resulting word (see Box 5). The letter fodder is typically concealed in misleading word units, 511 
which will be unhelpful to the anagram solution as indicated above; for this reason, many solvers will 512 
write out the letter-fodder in a random arrangement (such as a circle), in order to try to break up the 513 
In revi
w
Aha moment Insight and Crosswords 
16 
prior associations and allow new patterns to form (Johnstone, 2001 - see Box 5). However, difficulty 514 
can also be heightened by misdirection in the surface reading and by heavy disguise of the anagram 515 
indicator. 516 
 517 
 518 
Remote Association Puzzles and Cryptic Crosswords: Spreading Activation 519 
The Remote Associates Test (RAT), originally developed as a test of creativity (Mednick, 1962), has 520 
been refined and updated on a number of occasions, resulting in several sets of test materials 521 
(Functional Remote Associates Test (FRAT) Worthen & Clark, 1971; Compound Remote Associates 522 
(CRA) Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b), and has been translated into a number of languages (Salvi, 523 
Costantini, et al., 2016). The task challenge is for the participant to consider a triad of apparently 524 
unconnected words (e.g. Cottage, Swiss, Cake) and to come up with a fourth word (here ‘Cheese’) 525 
which is related to all three through some type of associative connective link. 526 
 527 
Although no longer commonly used as a test of creativity per se (Salvi, Costantini, et al., 2016), 528 
remote association puzzles are frequently used to study facets of creative problem-solving such as 529 
insight  (Bowden, et al., 2005; MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008; Cranford & Moss, 2012; Jarosz, et 530 
al., 2012; Chein & Weisberg, 2014; Salvi, Bricolo, Franconeri, Kounios, & Beeman, 2015; Webb, et al., 531 
2016), incubation effects (Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Cai, Mednick, Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 532 
2009; Sio & Ormerod, 2015), and fixedness upon the wrong solution (Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 533 
1991).  534 
 535 
RAT puzzles are thought to operate through a serendipitous spreading neuronal network (Collins & 536 
Loftus, 1975) akin to three ripples, whereby each triad member simultaneously but independently 537 
activates a retrieval search of semantic memory (Smith, Sifonis, & Angello, 2012; Kenett, Anaki, & 538 
Faust, 2014; Olteţeanu & Falomir, 2015). This global search operates as a multiple constraint 539 
problem, each cue word indicating a different attribute of the target word to be satisfied; the 540 
solution is arrived at by confluence of the ripples upon a jointly shared node (Gupta, Jang, Mednick, 541 
& Huber, 2012; Smith, Huber, & Vul, 2013).  542 
 543 
Alternatively, participants can adopt a more controlled generate-and-test strategy by considering 544 
just one of the three cues at a time, and testing out candidate solutions against each constraint for 545 
suitability, to ensure all requirements are met (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007; Smith, et al., 2013). 546 
This type of analytic, step-wise process is associated with lower insight ratings and different patterns 547 
of neural activity and eye movements when compared to sudden, non-methodical solutions 548 
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(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007; Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, & 549 
Jung-Beeman, 2009; Cranford & Moss, 2012; Salvi, Costantini, et al., 2016; Webb, et al., 2016). 550 
 551 
Impasse in solving RAT puzzles can arise from a fixation upon incorrect words, particularly those 552 
which are closely associated, syntactically or semantically, with one or more of the target words, and 553 
which therefore spring easily to mind (Harkins, 2006; Gupta, et al., 2012). This blocks access to more 554 
remotely associated words needed for the solution (Gupta, et al., 2012). Indeed, fixation in RAT 555 
problem-solving can be deliberately induced by priming commonplace associations which are 556 
unhelpful to the correct solution of the problem (Smith & Blankenship, 1991). 557 
 558 
Consequently, one factor leading to higher performance on RAT puzzles is the ability to avoid a bias 559 
towards high-frequency candidate answers, thus allowing more remotely associated possibilities to 560 
be accessed (Gupta, et al., 2012). This accords well with Mednick’s conceptualization of an 561 
uncreative person as one who possesses a ‘steep associative hierarchy’ containing an initially high 562 
number of stereotypical responses which rapidly tail off. By contrast, the highly creative individual 563 
will possess a ‘flat associative hierarchy’ containing many more items, and fewer stereotypical 564 
responses (Mednick, 1962 p.223). Creative individuals are thus argued to possess more associative 565 
links, leading to a more complex and less rigid lexical network (Gruszka & Necka, 2002; Kenett, et al., 566 
2014). 567 
 568 
In general terms, RAT puzzles pose a similar challenge to the ‘definition’ in cryptic crosswords, which 569 
may reference the target word with considerable concealment. In many cases, the sense required 570 
will not be the dominant association, but a secondary meaning (sometimes quite obscure) which will 571 
come much less readily to mind, and fixation upon the wrong sense is often deliberately induced by 572 
contextual means (Cleary, 1996 - see Box 1(c)). Breaking free from the stereotypical interpretation in 573 
order to consider a range of potentially remote synonym options is therefore key to lighting upon 574 
the correct solution (cf. Dominowski, 1995). 575 
 576 
Even closer to the format of the RAT puzzle, however, is the ‘double definition’ clue (Biddlecombe, 577 
2009; Connor, 2011a; Aarons, 2015), whereby the solver is presented with two words, both of which 578 
can be defined by the same polysemic or homographic solution word (Aarons, 2015; Pham, 2016). 579 
Occasionally, triad cryptic definitions (or even quadruple/quintuple) are also found (Connor, 2011a - 580 
see Box 6). As in jokes, double definition clues operate through ‘bisociation’ and an unexpected pay-581 
off: ‘the fun of seeing two disparate concepts suddenly become one’ (Connor, 2011a). 582 
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 583 
<INSERT BOX 6 SOMEWHERE HERE> 584 
 585 
Although the mechanism illustrated in Box 6 is very similar to that of RAT puzzles (’What one word 586 
links the following words?’), cryptic double definitions present extra difficulties, introducing 587 
elements of misdirection which are generally absent in RATs. First, in a dyad pairing, the two words 588 
are typically selected to form a familiar but unhelpful phrase with meaning of its own (e.g. 6(a) ’tea 589 
shop’), creating a distracting red herring (Connor, 2011a). This automatically triggered impasse must 590 
be resolved by decomposing the unhelpful ‘chunked’ phrase into its component features, allowing 591 
for an alternative parsing of the problem elements (Knoblich, et al., 1999).  Secondly, at least one of 592 
the words is usually ‘multicategorical’, meaning that it can used as different parts of speech in each 593 
of the clue and the solution (Aarons, 2015). Finally, the solver must identify the ‘double definition’ 594 
mechanism unaided, since there is no clue-type indicator for this class (Upadhyay, 2008a). For all 595 
these reasons, double definitions can be one of the hardest clue types to crack (Connor, 2011a), 596 
requiring multiple constraining misconceptions about the meaning, form and function of the clue 597 
elements to be resolved. 598 
 599 
Advanced Cryptic Crosswords 600 
So far, this article has only considered cryptic clues which might appear in daily ‘block-style’ cryptic 601 
puzzles (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). However, a second type of cryptic crossword - advanced cryptics  602 
- also exists, which raises the difficulty still further (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). Advanced cryptic 603 
crosswords are found in weekend newspapers and some magazines, and the grids generally use bars 604 
rather than blocked grids (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). Of these, the Listener Crossword is the most 605 
notoriously difficult, employing a high degree of clue mechanism concealment, obscure vocabulary, 606 
grids of startling originality and a thematic challenge, often involving a number of tricky lateral 607 
thinking steps on the basis of minimal guidance (Alberich, n.d.; Listener Editorial Team, 2013). 608 
Solvers submit weekly solutions for the distinction of appearing on an annual roll of honor, but few 609 
achieve an all-correct year (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). The Magpie,1 a monthly specialist magazine 610 
with five highly challenging advanced cryptic crosswords (and one mathematical puzzle) per issue, 611 
runs a similar all correct/roll of honor system, and is broadly of Listener standard (Friedlander & 612 
Fine, 2016). 613 
 614 
                         
1 http://www.piemag.com/about/. 
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It is difficult to pigeon-hole the challenges set by advanced cryptics: there is an acute thirst for 615 
originality among the aficionados of these puzzles which drives setters to produce ever more 616 
creative designs, mechanisms and themes which ‘require original thinking by the solver over and 617 
over again’ (Anthony, 2015), and annual awards for the most admired crossword in the Magpie and 618 
Listener series are presented to setters on the basis of solver recommendation (e.g. the Listener 619 
‘Ascot Gold Cup’2).  However, two particularly prominent sources of challenge are described below. 620 
 621 
Thematic challenge: acquisition of incidental hints 622 
Many advanced cryptic puzzles contain a thematic challenge, lending extra difficulty to the puzzle. In 623 
one common approach, a number of thematically related entries may have no clue, requiring the 624 
solver to deduce the answers gradually from cross-checking letters, as the grid is populated. 625 
Additionally, entire areas of the grid - such as the complete perimeter - may need to be completed 626 
with thematically relevant items or messages. In other puzzles, letter sequences spelling out 627 
thematic material may be concealed in the grid (for example on the diagonals), requiring the solver 628 
to find and highlight them through a ‘wordsearch’ process (Alberich, n.d.). 629 
 630 
Thematic puzzles rely upon the solver’s ability to make cross-connections between seemingly 631 
disparate items drawn from unpredictable and often obscure fields of knowledge: in this they share 632 
similarities with lateral thinking quizzes such as BBC2’s Only Connect and BBC Radio 4’s Round Britain 633 
Quiz (Connor, 2016). Once again, the problem space is ill-defined: the nature of the connection, the 634 
goal state and the pathway to achieve coherence are all unspecified.  635 
 636 
In order to solve these puzzles, solvers have to accumulate incidental information along the way: 637 
hints in the title or preamble might point obliquely to the theme; suggestive word fragments might 638 
appear in the grid, and thematic material might be gradually spelled out by other means - such as 639 
corrections to misprints in the clues. The PDM comes at the instant when all the disparate pieces of 640 
information suddenly come together to make sense. It is therefore comparatively rare for the theme 641 
to be deduced from the start (indeed this element of the puzzle is often termed the ‘endgame’): the 642 
solver must be able to tolerate - or even enjoy - the sensation of working for some time with unclear 643 
goals and incomplete, potentially conflicting and imprecise data. This may imply that advanced 644 
cryptic solvers tend towards personality traits such as a low ‘Need for Closure’ - the desire for 645 
definite knowledge and resolution of an issue (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); and a high ‘Tolerance of 646 
Ambiguity’ - the perceiving of ambiguous situations as desirable, challenging and interesting 647 
                         
2 http://www.listenercrossword.com/List_Awards.html 
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(Furnham, 1994; Zenasni, Besancon, & Lubart, 2008). Earlier research has also found that cryptic 648 
crossword solvers generally have a high ‘Need for Cognition’, relating to a person's tendency to seek 649 
out, engage in and enjoy effortful thinking (Friedlander & Fine, 2016; see Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 650 
1984; Von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013; Furnham & Thorne, 2013). 651 
 652 
An example of a thematic cryptic crossword challenge is shown in figure 2. Here the well-known 653 
children’s song ‘Old MacDonald Had a Farm’ is used as a source of thematic material: “the super-654 
familiar hiding under a thick cloak of obscurity, waiting to reward the determined solver with a PDM 655 
that feels like a surprise from an old friend” (Editorial Notes, 2013 p.10). 656 
 657 
<Insert Figure 2 somewhere here> 658 
 659 
Given the richness of the thematic material in this puzzle, which is expressed through multiple 660 
different devices (MacDonalds, animal noises, EIEIO title and the notation in the grid), it is likely that 661 
solvers experienced a number of PDMs - a series of mini ‘insight moments’ - en route to a final 662 
solution. Some PDMs would almost certainly have come out of the blue: in particular, the concealed 663 
instruction to correct the title by deleting consonants ”hides in a simple statement of fact a truly 664 
surprising vowel-only “correct” title that nobody could possibly have seen coming” (Editorial Notes, 665 
2013 p.10). The finding of the tune proved trickier:  666 
 667 
“The common experience was an initial search (often for “MacDonald”), followed by some 668 
confusion, followed by careful examination of the letters in the appropriate area, followed 669 
maybe by re-reading the preamble, combined with spotting some suspect letter duplications 670 
… in other words, a penny that did drop, but did it slowly” (Editorial Notes, 2013 p.10). 671 
 672 
As with RAT puzzles, thematic challenges appear to operate through a ripple of spreading activation 673 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975).  Each ‘clue to coherence’ (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990) 674 
embodies a different attribute of the target connection to be made; when these unconscious 675 
activations achieve confluence, the pattern emerges quite suddenly into consciousness, leading to 676 
the perception of coherence, and the PDM (a process described as ‘intuitive guiding’ - Bowers, et al., 677 
1990). Individual differences will again arise in the speed, complexity and gradient of the available 678 
interassociative connections (Bowers, et al., 1990; Gruszka & Necka, 2002; Smith, et al., 2012; 679 
Kenett, et al., 2014). 680 
 681 
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Individual differences in the ability to assimilate chance hints may also be relevant: as Louis Pasteur 682 
famously remarked of his ostensibly fortuitous scientific discoveries, “Chance favors only the 683 
prepared mind” (Lecture, University of Lille, 7 December 1854 Seifert, et al., 1995). ‘Opportunistic 684 
assimilation’ (Seifert, et al., 1995; Sio & Ormerod, 2015) refers to the ability to absorb new and 685 
serendipitously presented information, and to allow these additional jigsaw pieces to resolve or 686 
reframe one’s understanding of a problem which has previously reached impasse.  Much may 687 
depend on the initial preparation stage in which the solver becomes attuned to salient or important 688 
features they have already noted (Seifert, et al., 1995; Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002) 689 
which they maintain at a heightened level of activation, leading to priming effects (Sio & Ormerod, 690 
2015). Although potentially experiencing a number of failures and false leads  in the process 691 
(Ormerod, et al., 2002), progress is then made when the solver becomes intrigued by further 692 
patterns or anomalies (Kolodner & Wills, 1996), or stumbles across other relevant information 693 
(Weisberg, 2006) during completion of the grid. 694 
 695 
The process is well-illustrated by the editorial feedback on Magpie 151/2 ‘Five-a-side (on Tour)’ by 696 
Wan, which was themed around a subset of the 72 names of French scientists, engineers and 697 
mathematicians engraved on the Eiffel Tower (five from each side): 698 
 699 
“In solving terms, there was a single critical, and memorable, moment of realisation when 700 
the set of names suddenly made sense. This was normally preceded by a number of less 701 
memorable moments of thinking that there was some other reason for grouping, by 702 
nationality, or by specialisation, or by university affiliation, or whatever. All the false trails 703 
had some value, because you were always going to be alert to French scientists or engineers 704 
once a few showed up. The feeling was of constant small steps forward, always with some 705 
difficulty, but never with that feeling of brick-wall despair that can accompany certain 706 
thematic endgames.” (Editorial Notes, 2015 p.9). 707 
 708 
Individual differences in openness to experience and sensitivity to external stimuli could be relevant 709 
in these contexts, regulating the degree to which a person inhibits or remains subconsciously 710 
receptive to ostensibly incidental information (Laughlin, 1967; Simonton, 2003; Carson, Peterson, & 711 
Higgins, 2003; Weisberg, 2006; Carson, 2010; Russ & Dillon, 2011). A reduced tendency to pre-filter 712 
extraneous information as irrelevant (i.e. reduced latent inhibition) may enhance the ability to make 713 
lateral associations, and has been associated with both psychometrically and behaviorally assessed 714 
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creativity, openness to experience, and richer, more diverse associative networks (Simonton, 2003; 715 
Carson, 2010). 716 
 717 
Spatial or Transformational Challenges: Reconceptualizing the layout 718 
An additional source of difficulty in many advanced cryptic crosswords lies in the transformation of 719 
some elements. For example, some or all of the answers might need to be encoded or otherwise 720 
thematically altered before being entered in the grid. As in American-style ‘variety puzzles’, such as 721 
those appearing periodically in the Sunday edition of the NY Times (Wikipedia, 2017a), this might 722 
involve anagramming, reversing or curtailing entries (resulting in non-words in the grid); but more 723 
complex adjustments might also be required. For example the solver might deduce that all overlong 724 
items, such as APHID (to fit a grid space of 3) and CHINWAG (to fit 5), might need to be entered 725 
using Greek characters to replace the English names for the Greek alphabet (i.e. AΦD and XNWAG  726 
Alberich, n.d.). Or all entries might need to be encoded using a Playfair cipher, with the keyword to 727 
be deduced (Upadhyay, 2015). Once again, the problem space is ill-defined: the solver has to 728 
assimilate key hints or salient features as the puzzle progresses in order to deduce what adjustments 729 
need to be made, and may pursue a number of false leads before hitting upon the correct solution. 730 
Meanwhile, the completion of the grid is made much harder by the absence of securely confirmed 731 
cross-checking letters while the entry mechanism remains unresolved. 732 
 733 
Further to this, some advanced cryptics require a type of restructuring in which the dimensions, 734 
layout or salient features of the grid itself are changed (see Figure 3). In these puzzles, there is a 735 
need to reconceptualize spatial assumptions involving placement and layout constraints, and to 736 
dismantle an existing array in favor of a new, radically different format. Cunningham highlights these 737 
two characteristics as strong features of classic spatially-oriented insight puzzles such as the nine-dot 738 
problem, the ten-coin triangle and the chain necklace puzzle (Cunningham, et al., 2009 -  figure 1). 739 
Difficulty is also heightened in many of these classic puzzles by the need to identify and verify what 740 
the eventual solution would look like (MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001; Cunningham, et al., 741 
2009): this prevents steady progress towards a concrete and visualizable goal state (MacGregor, et 742 
al., 2001), even if the eventual solution criteria and constraints are made clear.  743 
 744 
<Insert figure 3 somewhere here> 745 
 746 
So, for example, in figure 3, the solver is made aware by means of a hidden message that the grid 747 
must be cut up and reassembled; but the purpose of this transformation, the eventual grid layout 748 
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and even the cutting line must all be deduced. Additional difficulty is introduced by the elliptical 749 
reference to a ‘saw’; given the need to cut the grid and the zig-zag nature of the cut, the required 750 
interpretation of the term (’saw’ = a maxim, saying) might not spring to mind. Without 751 
understanding this hint, the unspoken endgame (that of reconstructing a well-known phrase along 752 
the top and bottom line) cannot be interpreted correctly. 753 
 754 
Incidental support for cryptic crossword clues as a form of insight puzzle 755 
The paper review set out above plausibly suggests that cryptic crosswords can function as insight 756 
problems, using a variety of techniques, such as misdirection and an ill-defined problem space, to 757 
increase the likelihood of an ‘Aha!’ response. However, following the methodology set out in the 758 
‘Grounded Expertise Components Approach’ (GECA - Friedlander & Fine, 2016), the first step in the 759 
current research program was to secure empirically based corroboration for this a priori assumption. 760 
 761 
Confirmation was therefore sought as part of an 84-item broad-based questionnaire, intended to 762 
characterize the cryptic crossword solving population across a wide number of dimensions. The full 763 
methodology for this research was set out in a previous publication (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). In 764 
total, 805 solvers across the full range of solving ability took part, although there was some attrition 765 
towards the end of the survey. Solvers were objectively assigned to research categories on the basis 766 
of benchmarked criteria, resulting in both a 2-way (Ordinary/Expert - O/E) and a 3-way 767 
(Ordinary/High ability/Super-Expert - O/H/S) categorization of participant expertise. For full details 768 
of the categorization rationale, see Friedlander & Fine (2016).  769 
 770 
One key hypothesis of the survey was that “cryptic crossword solving regularly generates “Aha!” or 771 
insight moments, supporting the hypothesis that the cryptic clue is a type of insight problem through 772 
misdirection; and that this pleasurable experience is a salient driver of cryptic crossword 773 
participation” (Friedlander & Fine, 2016, p.7). To this end, the survey included a number of questions 774 
pertinent to the current discussion: results are presented below. All chi-square analyses are 775 
bootstrapped and 95% confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. 776 
 777 
Evidence for the ‘Penny-Dropping Moment’ (PDM) and Incubation effects 778 
 779 
PDM as a motivating experience 780 
Participants were asked to rate 26 statements relating to their motivation for solving cryptic 781 
crosswords on a 5-point Likert scale (1= ‘Completely Disagree’; 5= ‘Completely Agree’). There were 782 
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786 responses (O: n=388; H: n=221; S: n=177). Table 1(A) shows the five highest responses to these 783 
26 statements (with abbreviated descriptions). As previously reported (Friedlander & Fine, 2016) all 784 
groups rated the ‘Aha!’ moment (PDM) as a key motivational factor for solving cryptics; closely allied 785 
with this was the statement ‘Solving well-written clues gives me a buzz - it makes me smile or laugh 786 
out loud’ which was ranked 4th in importance. The feeling of fulfilment - whether with the 787 
completed grid or with the ‘uniquely satisfying’ cryptic crossword puzzle format - was also ranked 788 
highly (2nd and 5th most important). There were no statistically significant differences between the 789 
expertise groups for any of these statements.  This suggests that - as for jokes - an important part of 790 
the crossword puzzle-solving experience lies in the pleasurable emotional reward bound up with the 791 
resolution of incongruity at the moment of insight. Studies of jokes and humor have found that 792 
laughter is associated with the release of endorphins which may be important in this context: the 793 
opiate effects of endorphins create a sense of wellbeing, pleasure and a sense of satisfaction 794 
(Dunbar, et al., 2011). By contrast, extrinsic motivators, such as prizes, competitions or public 795 
acclaim, were not important to participants across the board (Friedlander & Fine, 2016). 796 
 797 
<Table 1 is inserted somewhere here> 798 
 799 
Incubation effect 800 
In a separate series of questions intended to capture the solving preferences of participants, 801 
respondents were invited to rate statements on a 3-way Likert scale (’No/Never’- 802 
’Perhaps/Sometimes’- ’Yes/Always’; together with a null response option ‘Don’t know/Not 803 
applicable’). 796 responses were made (O: 395; H: 223; S:178). Results are given in Table 1(B): 804 
figures represent the summed percentage of “Sometimes” and “Always” responses unless otherwise 805 
indicated. 806 
 807 
Nearly 95% of solvers (94.6%; O: 95.7%; H: 95.5%; S: 91.1%) confirmed that ‘incubation effects’ - 808 
setting the crossword aside for a while, in order to resolve periods of impasse - were a feature of the 809 
solving process. Indeed, 80.3% of participants agreed with the full ‘Yes’ option: “Yes - the answer is 810 
often obvious when I return to the crossword” with a further 14.3% agreeing that “I sometimes find it 811 
helpful to take a break, but I often return to the thoughts I was having previously”. S solvers were 812 
least likely to have taken advantage of incubation breaks; even so, differences in the distribution of 813 
incubation effect between groups failed to reach statistical significance (χ2(4) =8.681, p=.070, 814 
Cramer’s V=.074 [.040, .135]). 815 
 816 
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Conversely, S participants were most likely (84.8%) to have found that solutions occurred to them at 817 
least occasionally when they were engaged in totally unrelated activities (e.g. shopping, driving, 818 
taking a bath). Overall 79.8% of participants agreed with this statement (O: 77.4%; H: 79.9%; S: 819 
84.8%), but differences between the groups again failed to reach statistical significance (χ2(4) =5.393, 820 
p=.249, Cramer’s V=.058 [.032, .115]). 821 
 822 
Impasse and the ‘Aha’ moment 823 
Most participants also agreed that their enjoyment of the PDM was enhanced if they had needed to 824 
struggle with a clue (79.6%; O: 83.8%; H: 78.0%; S: 72.5%) although some respondents claimed that 825 
the ‘Aha!’ moment was unaffected by the effort expended (16.3%; O:13.7%; H: 17.0%; S: 21.3%). 826 
Very few participants claimed either that it decreased with effort expended (2.6%) or that they had 827 
never experienced a PDM (1.4%) when solving cryptics. Differences between groups approached, 828 
but did not achieve statistical significance (χ2(6) =11.796, p=.067, Cramer’s V=.086 [.059, .153]) and 829 
inspection of standardized residuals indicated that this was driven by the higher number of S solvers 830 
in the ‘Makes no difference’ group (z =1.7). 831 
 832 
Differences in solving approach between cryptic crossword expertise groups 833 
Participants were also asked about their approach to solving cryptics in order to explore potential 834 
differences between the expertise groups; Table 2 highlights a number of key findings. 835 
 836 
<insert Table 2 somewhere here> 837 
 838 
Suppression of the misleading surface reading 839 
Survey participants were asked to indicate whether they noticed the surface reading of a clue first, 840 
or read it purely as code. Two response options (’I always read the surface meaning first’, ‘I tend to 841 
read the surface first’) favored the surface reading; two options indicated that deliberate attempts 842 
were made to exclude ‘reading for sense’ (’I try to exclude the misleading context’, ‘I always read as 843 
code: the surface meaning could be gobbledygook’); and there was one mid-way option (’Bit of both; 844 
not sure which predominates’). 797 responses were made (O: n=395; H: n=223; S: n=179); 845 
summarized details (Surface/Bit of Both/Code) are given in Table 2(A). 846 
 847 
Most solvers (45.4%; O: 50.4%; H: 42.6%; S: 38.0%) selected the mid-way point, though this 848 
decreased with expertise; S solvers were most likely to suppress ‘reading for sense’ in favor of 849 
‘reading for code’ (36.3%); the opposite was true for O solvers, who tended to read much more for 850 
sense (33.2%). Differences between the groups were highly significant (χ2(4) =33.21, p<.001, 851 
Cramer’s V=.144 [.105, .199]) and inspection of standardized residuals indicated that this was driven 852 
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by higher levels of H (31.8%, z=2.0, p <.05) and S (36.3%, z=3.0, p <.01) solvers who suppressed the 853 
surface reading; and lower levels of O solvers who did this (16.5%, z= -3.5, p <.001). 854 
 855 
Personal preferences leading to greater enjoyment of Advanced Cryptic crosswords 856 
Solvers were asked to identify whether they solved Advanced Cryptic crosswords, and, if so, whether 857 
the quality of the clueing or the tricky endgame (or a bit of both) was their primary source of 858 
enjoyment (Table 2(B)). A small proportion of both expert groups chose not to solve Advanced 859 
Cryptic crosswords, although this was higher for H solvers than for S (’I don’t do Advanced Cryptics’: 860 
8.0%; H 12.1%; S 2.8%). O solvers, by definition, do not solve this type of crossword (Friedlander & 861 
Fine, 2016, p.8) and were omitted from this analysis. Where a preference was indicated, for H 862 
solvers the quality of the clueing was paramount (27.4%; H 35.9%; S 16.8%) whereas, for a larger 863 
number of S solvers, the lateral-thinking endgame was the most important attraction (20.9%; H 864 
13.5%; S 30.2%). Differences between the groups were highly significant (χ2(3)=40.47, p< .001, 865 
Cramer’s V=.317 [.226, .407]) and inspection of standardized residuals indicated that this was driven 866 
by higher levels of H (12.1%, z=2.2, p <.05) and lower levels of S (2.8%, z=-2.5, p <.05) who failed to 867 
tackle Advanced Cryptics; higher levels of H (35.9%, z=2.4, p <.05) and lower levels of S (16.8%, z=-868 
2.7, p <.01) whose main target for enjoyment was the smooth clueing; and higher levels of S (30.2%, 869 
z=2.7,  p <.01) and lower levels of H (13.5%, z=-2.4,  p <.05) whose primary focus was the endgame.  870 
 871 
Speed-solving and challenge 872 
Solvers were also asked whether they would be disappointed if they solved a crossword rapidly 873 
(Table 2(C)). Although chi-square showed a significant association overall (χ2(4) =9.99, p= .041, 874 
Cramer’s V=.079 [.050, .139]), inspection of the standardized residuals revealed no stand-out 875 
elements. As expected, S solvers (among whom were a number of competition-focused ‘Speed 876 
Solvers’ - see Friedlander & Fine, 2009) would be least troubled by a rapid solve (’No: I enjoy speed-877 
solving’: 12.7%; O 9.9%, z=-1.6; H 14.3%, z=0.7; S 16.9%, z=1.6), but, even for this group, numbers 878 
were low, and standardized residuals were non-significant. Nearly half the solvers indicated that 879 
they would be disappointed without a good challenge to wrestle with, and although there was some 880 
variation across the expertise groups (48.0%; O 48.4%, z=0.1; H 52.0%, z=0.9; S 42.1%, z=-1.1) 881 
inspection of the standardized residuals were once again non-significant. 882 
 883 
Indeed, when asked whether they might switch newspapers if the crossword challenge became 884 
routinely easy (Table 2(D)), nearly 70% of solvers indicated that they would consider this (69.7%; O 885 
70.1%; H 71.7%; S 66.3%), with differences between the groups being statistically non-significant. 886 
 887 
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Potential contribution of cryptic crosswords to insight research 888 
The above review suggests that the cryptic crossword domain could prove a useful addition to the 889 
repository of insight problem paradigms. That they are capable of triggering insight on a regular 890 
basis is quite clear: survey results reported above indicate that cryptic crossword solvers were 891 
primarily motivated to solve cryptics because of the ‘Aha!’ or ‘Penny-Drop’ moment, and also 892 
reported that the ‘laugh-out-loud’ moment at the point of solving the clues was highly enjoyable. 893 
Furthermore, the detailed review of cryptic clues set out above demonstrates that they use a broad 894 
variety of insight-triggering mechanisms shared in common with a wide range of other insight 895 
problem formats. A single cryptic crossword puzzle thus presents a unique compendium of 896 
heterogeneous challenges which sets it apart from all other methodologies currently available; and 897 
this should facilitate the comparison of outcomes between device types within the crossword itself, 898 
as well as with other insight puzzle challenges external to the crossword. 899 
 900 
One small caveat is that cryptic crosswords are primarily restricted to a number of English language 901 
speaking countries, although a few cryptic type puzzles do exist in Dutch and German. This may 902 
reduce the flexibility of cryptic crosswords as an insight puzzle paradigm. Straight-definition 903 
crosswords are, of course, available in all languages, but lack the cryptic elements described in detail 904 
in this paper which set this puzzle form apart and trigger the insight moment. 905 
 906 
Cryptic crossword clues thus reliably trigger insight experiences, but (as for all insight puzzles) this is 907 
not exclusively the case.  In cryptic crossword trials filmed for transcription using Verbal Protocol 908 
Analysis (VPA), casual inspection of the recordings suggests that not every clue produces as many 909 
PDMs; and not every solver follows the same path to solution. Systematic analysis of the video 910 
recordings (on which see further Friedlander & Fine, 2016) will allow us to take full advantage of the 911 
think-aloud protocol to capture a wide range of strategically important factors such as intuitive vs. 912 
analytical approaches to clue solution; the length of time spent in impasse on each clue before 913 
moving onto another; the frequency of return to an obstinately resistant item; perseveration with an 914 
incorrect solution pathway; the antecedents of “Aha!” solution moments; the use of cross-checking 915 
letters as opportunistic solution prompts; the suppression of the surface meaning on initial reading; 916 
the certainty of correctness (without double-checking) on solution; and the use of jottings such as 917 
candidate anagram letters (see Box 5 above) to facilitate solution (on the use of VPA in the GECA 918 
methodological approach, see further Friedlander & Fine, 2016). These aspects are all highly relevant 919 
to the discussion of insight problem solving across a wide range of problem domains. 920 
 921 
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As a precursor to the analysis, the clues used in the crossword trials will be individually analyzed to 922 
identify salient features, such as the mechanisms employed, the level and number of the constraints 923 
preventing solution, and the predicted difficulty which flows from this (following e.g. Knoblich, et al., 924 
1999; MacGregor & Cunningham, 2009; Cunningham, et al., 2009). It is very possible that the clues 925 
vary in difficulty on a principled basis, and if so, this might lead to a better understanding of what 926 
makes a cryptic crossword clue enjoyable, and more likely to trigger insight, to lead to impasse, or to 927 
invoke ‘Immediate Insight’ solutions. Given the cross-over between cryptic crossword clue types and 928 
other insight puzzles, this should shed helpful light on insight mechanisms in other areas, too. 929 
 930 
Logistically, cryptic crosswords also offer a number of advantages over other puzzle types. In the first 931 
place, there is no lack of material: cryptic crosswords appear daily in all of the British newspapers, 932 
and widely across the world in countries with historically strong connections to Britain (e.g. Canada, 933 
Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Malta: Friedlander & Fine, 2016). It is thus entirely 934 
possible to commission a professionally composed, high-quality puzzle specifically for a research 935 
study thus guaranteeing that all participants will be naïve to the challenge. Clue solution rates are 936 
high, too: in trials involving 28 solvers (both expert and non-expert) tackling a commissioned 27-clue 937 
crossword of medium difficulty, 682 of the 756 clues (90.2%) were solved correctly within the 45 938 
minute time limit (Fine & Friedlander, in preparation). Solving times for those who finished the 939 
entire puzzle (n=19) could be very rapid indeed (range solving times: 10m47s - 40m30s; mean 940 
solving time for finishers 23m:43s, median 22m15s) resulting in solutions occurring, on average, 941 
approximately once a minute (Fine & Friedlander, in preparation). 942 
 943 
Fast solvers in this trial were all highly expert in the field (Fine & Friedlander, in preparation), and the 944 
survey results set out above also indicate that experts may approach the solving of cryptic clues in 945 
subtly different ways to less expert solvers of equivalent experience. What could be seen as a 946 
disadvantage for this methodology (that cryptic crossword solving is a niche activity requiring inside 947 
knowledge of and experience with the clue mechanisms) thus becomes a compelling strength: there 948 
is much that might be gained from studying expert insight puzzle solvers at work, and this is 949 
currently impossible in other insight domains (such as RAT puzzles or matchstick math) which, by 950 
necessity, always use naïve populations. 951 
 952 
Lamenting the lack of expertise studies in the insight area, Batchelder and Alexander (2012) even 953 
suggested artificially training groups of individuals to produce ‘expert’ solvers of such problems, 954 
commenting that experts “might have the capacity to rapidly shift their search spaces until the type 955 
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of space that contains the solution occurs to them” (Batchelder & Alexander, 2012, p.88). However, 956 
this proposal overlooks the potential role of individual differences: MacGregor and Cunningham 957 
argue that there may be reliable variations in the ability of individual subjects to solve insight 958 
problems (2008; see also DeYoung, et al., 2008; Ovington, et al., 2016) which may undermine the 959 
ecological validity of training ‘experts’ from a randomly selected sample of individuals. Within the 960 
crossword field we found naturally-occurring expertise groupings - all with equivalent levels of 961 
experience over many decades in the field, but with quite different expertise outcomes (Friedlander 962 
& Fine, 2016) - and this presents a unique opportunity for exploration. 963 
 964 
The cryptic crossword survey data set out in Tables 1 and 2 above hints at some interesting 965 
differences between the various expertise groups and their approach to solving this form of puzzle. 966 
Most intriguing of all is the possibility that experts have an enhanced capacity to resist the red-967 
herring set for them, by electively divorcing the reading of the clue from its surface meaning (’the 968 
surface meaning could be gobbledygook’), and thus shielding the mind from the deliberate 969 
misdirection. Whether expert solvers therefore experience the full phenomenological experience of 970 
the ‘Aha!’ moment upon solution of the clue is thus an interesting angle for further investigation: 971 
experts claim to be equally motivated by the promise of the ‘Aha!’ moment (Table 1), yet, 972 
paradoxically, appear to suppress that very need for Representational Change which might have 973 
been considered fundamental to the insight experience. Experts also solve more rapidly, with speed 974 
prowess being a primary focus for some (Friedlander & Fine, 2009), and this affords an opportunity 975 
to explore rapid ‘pop-out’ solutions and the relevance of ‘Immediate Insight’ to the exploration of 976 
the ‘Aha!’ moment. 977 
 978 
It is also notable that significantly more ‘Super-Experts’ engage in Advanced Cryptic puzzles than 979 
either High Expert or Ordinary solvers, and that their primary focus in doing so is significantly more 980 
often linked, not with the appreciation of the smooth misdirection of the clueing itself, but with the 981 
complexity, novelty and lateral thinking challenge of the Advanced Cryptic endgame, which is more 982 
akin to the ‘classic’ insight puzzle format in its use of thematic or spatial features. This again affords 983 
opportunities to examine the multi-dimensional nature of the demands posed by different insight 984 
problem types, as described in the body of this article, and the interplay with individual differences 985 
shown by problem solvers, in terms of their thinking and personality styles. 986 
 987 
Conclusion 988 
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In sum, this preliminary review suggests that cryptic crossword puzzles may be a promising source of 989 
insight problems offering a number of potential advantages over some of the puzzles and riddles 990 
previously used: for example, they are readily obtainable in potentially unlimited supply, solvable 991 
within acceptable time limits and suited to the simultaneous exploration of a variety of puzzle types 992 
and their potentially distinct solving mechanisms. Uniquely among existing paradigms, they also 993 
afford us the opportunity to study insight-solving expertise in action and to identify the 994 
characteristics and methodological approaches of those with a particular propensity to solve these 995 
puzzles effectively. There is therefore much to explore, and the discussion above suggests a number 996 
of particularly interesting avenues which we are currently pursuing.  We believe that this new 997 
paradigm may prove to be a useful source of theoretically and empirically grounded, heterogeneous 998 
insight challenges; and that it is well-placed to shed a unique light on the workings of this elusive and 999 
intriguing aspect of human cognition. 1000 
 1001 
  1002 
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 1003 
Table 1: Responses by expertise category to questions about ‘insight’ properties of crossword 1004 
clues 1005 
 1006 
 O H S All  
Groups 
(A) Top responses to 'Crossword Motivation' question (Mean 
scores, out of 5) 
   
Number of responses to question 388 221 177 786 
1. Enjoy "Penny-Drop Moment" 3.92 3.92 4.07 3.96 
2. Cryptics are uniquely satisfying 3.89 4.05 3.91 3.94 
3. Mental exercise to keep brain sharp 3.88 3.83 3.85 3.86 
4. Makes me smile or laugh 3.79 3.80 3.64 3.76 
5. Satisfaction of filled grid 3.46 3.61 3.36 3.48 
     
(B) % Participants agreeing to the following statements     
Number of responses to question 395 223 178 796 
‘Setting the crossword aside for a while helps’a 95.7 95.5 91.1 94.6 
- ‘sometimes, though not always’ 12.4 15.7 16.8 14.3 
- ‘always (answer is obvious on return)’ 83.3 79.8 74.3 80.3 
‘I have solved clues when I'm doing something else’  77.5 79.8 84.8 79.8 
‘The Aha! feeling is most intense after a long struggle’      
- ‘Yes’ 83.8 78.0 72.5 79.6 
- ‘No difference one way or the other’ 13.7 17.0 21.3 16.3 
a There were 797 responses to this question; S n=179 1007 
 1008 
 1009 
Table 2: Differences in approach to solving cryptics 1010 
 1011 
 O H S All 
Groups 
Number of responses 395 223 179 797 
 
(A) Do you notice the surface reading or the codes of a clue 
first? 
    
- Surface first 33.2 25.6 25.7 29.4 
- Bit of both: surface and codes 50.4 42.6 38.0 45.4 
- Read as code, not for meaning 16.5*** 31.8* 36.3** 25.2 
 
(B) What do you look for in an Advanced Cryptic crossword?a 
    
- I don't do Advanced Cryptics n/a 12.1* 2.8* 8.0 
- Great clues n/a 35.9* 16.8** 27.4 
- Good balance of clues and endgame n/a 38.6 50.3 43.8 
- Tricky and satisfying Endgame n/a 13.5* 30.2** 20.9 
 
(C) Are you disappointed if you solve a crossword rapidly?b 
    
- No: I enjoy rapid solving 9.9 14.3 16.9 12.7 
- Don't mind either way 41.8 33.6 41.0 39.3 
- Yes: I like to wrestle with the clues 48.4 52.0 42.1 48.0 
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(D) I would change my crossword if the challenge got too easy 
('Yes') 
 
70.1 
 
71.7 
 
66.3 
 
69.7 
 1012 
(*/**/*** indicates significance at the .05/.01/.001 level). 1013 
a  Ordinary solvers, by definition, do not solve Advanced Cryptic crosswords. %s relate to 402 participants (H=223; S=179). 1014 
b There were 796 responses to this question; S n=178 1015 
 1016 
 1017 
 1018 
Boxes 1019 
 1020 
BOX 1 | Illustration of cryptic clue mechanisms: misleading surface readings 
Clue 1(a) Active women iron some skirts and shirts (9) - (Schulman, 1996 p.309) 
The definition is ‘Active women’ = an obliquely phrased straight definition for FEMINISTS 
The wordplay comprises: FE (iron, chemical symbol) + MINIS (plural form of a type of skirt, hence 
the word ‘some’) + TS (= plural of ‘T’, an abbreviation for ‘T-Shirt’) 
The surface meaning is highly misleading; additionally, the interpretation of IRON relies on a 
linguistic ambiguity (homonym employing different part of speech - noun, not verb). 
 
Clue 1(b) Grown-up kid starts to gossip on aunt’s Twitter (4) 
The definition is ‘Grown-up kid’ = a misleading circumlocution for GOAT 
The wordplay plays on the word ‘starts’ (in the nounal sense of ‘leading letters’, not verbal sense of 
‘begins’) as an acrostic indicator: ‘Gossip On Aunt’s Twitter’. 
 
Clue 1(c) Scrub the cooker top and clean out (6) - (Cleary, 1996, from the Guardian, No. 20248, 26 
Jan 1995) 
The definition is ‘Scrub’ = CANCEL, a non-prototypical interpretation. 
The wordplay is a complex anagram of ‘C’ (= ‘the cooker top’ i.e. its initial letter) + CLEAN. The 
anagram indicator is the word ‘OUT’. 
An important secondary function of the wordplay is to guide the solver away from the required 
definition of the target word, and to strongly promote the more prototypical sense ‘Scrub = Clean’ 
by contextual means (Cleary, 1996). 
 
Wordplay elements (Friedlander & Fine, 2016) 
The algebraic/programming nature of the cryptic clue means that wordplay components may be 
flexibly recombined or anagrammed to form new units, e.g.: 
● A+B = C (FAT+HER = FATHER) 
● rev(A) = B (TRAMS -> SMART) 
● anag(A+B) = C (CAT+HAT = ATTACH) 
● trunc(A) = B (CUTTER -> UTTER) 
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Clues usually contain an ‘indicator’ identifying what type of transformation is required 
(Biddlecombe, 2009), but equally might be of a punning/novelty type (usually indicated by a 
question mark at the end of the clue). 
 1021 
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BOX 2 | Illustration of cryptic clue mechanisms: jokes and puns 
Clue 2(a) Frightened to death? (6,5) - (Cleary, 1996) 
Answer = SCARED STIFF, with a punning reference to ‘STIFF’ = ‘corpse’, confirming the correctness 
of the solution. 
Clue 2(b) Discovered why electrical equipment was dangerous? (9) - (Collingridge, 2010) 
Answer = UNEARTHED (the latent secondary sense relates to electrical wiring) 
Clue 2(c) Yorkshire beauty queen, we hear, pulls the wool over one's eyes (8) (’Orlando’, in 
Connor, 2011b) 
Answer = MISLEADS. The pun (’Miss Leeds’) is indicated by a homophone indicator ‘we hear’, 
common in joke-style clues. 
Clue 2(d) A wicked thing? (6) - (Aarons, 2015) 
Answer = CANDLE. The clue relies on the two different homographic senses of the word ‘wicked’. 
Difficulty is heightened by the distinctly different pronunciation (/wik’id/ ; /wikt/) and by the non-
prototypical sense of ‘wicked’ which is required (= ‘possessing a wick’). As in most punning or 
riddle-style clues, the quirky or nonsensical nature of the answer is flagged by the use of a question 
mark, which serves as a clue-type indicator. 
 1023 
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BOX 3 | Rebus puzzles 
3(a) poPPd  (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008) 
Solution: ‘Two peas in a pod”: auditory pun on ‘P’ = ‘pea’, together with spatial location of the 
letters inside the word ‘pod’. 
3(b) TIMING TIM ING (Smith & Blankenship, 1989) 
Solution: ‘Split second timing’: the second instance of ‘timing’ is split into two parts. 
3(c) M CE /M CE /M CE (Salvi, Costantini, et al., 2016) 
Solution: ‘Three Blind Mice’: the mice have no ‘I’s (eyes) 
3(d) R. P. I.  (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2009) 
Solution: ‘A grave error’ (it should have been written as R.I.P.) 
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BOX 4 | Illustration of cryptic clue mechanisms: rebus-like components 
 
Clue 4(a): Player with only one leg? (4) (Guardian Crossword No. 25351, by Tramp; 17 June 2011)  
Answer = IPOD, a type of music player. 
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The clue works by comic analogy to ‘TRIPOD’, with the letter ‘I’ standing in for the numeral ‘one’. 
This is very similar to the rebus puzzle at Box 3(a). 
 
Clue 4(b): Must’ve? (5,7,2,3,3) (Guardian Crossword No. 25351, by Tramp; 17 June 2011)  
Answer = THINK OUTSIDE OF THE BOX.  
Wordplay: MUSE [think] outside of TV [‘the box’] - a rebus-like construction, also telling the solver 
what he must literally do to solve the clue. The punctuation is a highly distracting feature. 
 
Clue 4(c): Part of it ’it an iceberg (7)  - (Moorey, 2009)  
Answer = TITANIC.  
Wordplay: substring(A+B+C+D) leading to a hidden word, indicated by the instruction ‘Part of’. The 
Titanic did indeed hit an iceberg, making this an ‘&Lit’ (or ‘all-in-one’) clue: the clue as a whole 
functions as both the definition and the wordplay (Manley, 2014; Aarons, 2015). 
 
Clue 4(d): GEGS (9,4) - (A well-known but unattributed clue, see Aarons, 2015) 
Answer = SCRAMBLED EGGS. There is no guidance in the clue: the solver must literally ‘say what 
they see’. Compare the rebus examples 3(b) and 3(c) in Box 3 above. 
 
Clue 4(e): H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O (5) - (Another old chestnut of uncertain provenance, see Aarons, 2015) 
Answer = WATER. Wordplay: “H to O”, if spoken aloud, sounds like H2O. 
 
Clue 4(f): Somewhat swollen condition of female diving bird? (9) - Times 24451, Feb 3rd 2010 
Answer = PUFFINESS = ‘Somewhat swollen condition’ 
Wordplay = a quirky charade of PUFFIN + ‘-ESS’ suffix, often indicative of a female in an animal 
species (e.g. ‘lioness’). 
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BOX 5 | Cryptic Crosswords - Anagram clues 
 
5(a) Tube taken to theatre for three-act play (8) (Aarons, 2015 p.371) 
ANSWER = CATHETER (=’Tube taken to theatre’).  
Letter fodder = THREE-ACT; anagram indicator = ‘PLAY’. 
There is heavy misdirection drawing the solver away from the required medical context and into 
theatrical performance and the ‘London Underground’ (the ‘Tube’). 
 
5(b) Doctor Watson's kit - or bits of modern office furniture (12)(Biddlecombe, 2009) 
ANSWER = WORKSTATIONS (’bits of modern office furniture’) 
Letter fodder = WATSON’S KIT OR; anagram-indicator = ‘Doctor’ 
Misleading disguise of anagram indicator in the name ‘Doctor Watson’, making the parsing of the 
clue unclear. 
 
5(c) Find rare new frequencies beyond the visible range (8) (Johnstone, 2001, p.70) 
ANSWER = INFRARED (’frequencies beyond the visible range’) 
Letter fodder = FIND RARE; anagram indicator = NEW 
Johnstone points out that solvers often write out candidate letters as shown below, in order to 
facilitate the solving process: 
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BOX 6 | Illustration of cryptic ‘double definition’ clues: RAT-like mechanism 
 
Clue 6(a): Tea shop (5) (Biddlecombe, 2009, attributed to Azed) 
Answer = GRASS. 
Synonym 1: ‘Tea’ = slang for ‘marijuana’ = GRASS 
Synonym 2: ‘Shop’ = slang for ‘betray to the police’ = GRASS. ‘Shop’ has to be taken as a verb in this 
meaning, in contrast to the nounal function in the clue itself. 
 
Clue 6(b): Savings book (7) (Aarons, 2015, p.365) 
Answer = RESERVE. 
Synonym 1: ‘Savings’ = a RESERVE of money 
Synonym 2: ‘book’ = to RESERVE (a table etc.): again verbal (solution) rather than nounal (clue) 
 
Clue 6(c): Quits flat (4) (Connor, 2011a, by Rufus) 
Answer = EVEN 
Synonym 1: ‘Quits’ = ‘neither owing, nor owed’ = EVEN: adjective, not verb 
Synonym 2: ‘Flat’ = ‘level’ = EVEN: adjective, not noun 
 
Clue 6(d): Left red wine in harbour (4).(Biddlecombe, 2009; Aarons, 2015 p.366) 
Answer = PORT, a triple-definition 
Synonym 1: ‘Left’ = ‘on PORT side’: adjective, not verb 
Synonym 2: ‘Red wine’ = fortified PORT wine 
Synonym 3: ‘Harbour’ = PORT 
 
Clue 6(e) Soldier even fixed uniform (7) - Daily Telegraph 28392  
Answer = REGULAR, a quadruple definition with a misleading military surface reading 
Synonym 1: ‘Soldier’ = REGULAR (i.e. member of permanent forces) 
Synonym 2: ‘even’ = ‘level’ = REGULAR (adjective, not adverb) 
Synonym 3: ‘fixed’ = ‘at set intervals’ = REGULAR (adjective, not verb) 
Synonym 4: ‘uniform’ = ‘unvarying’ = REGULAR (adjective, not noun) 
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